Over the past decade, there has been a surge of interest among academic researchers, policy makers, and the broader public in "tail events" -rare, high-impact events. There are many possible reasons for this: the occurrence of particularly salient tail events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S. financial crisis; the rise of the internet and social media, which have made news and information about tail events much more accessible than before; and the popularization, by Taleb (2007), of the notion of "black swans," to name just a few. In this article, I start by summarizing some recent progress in our understanding of the psychology of tail events. I suggest that much of this progress has centered on the concept of "probability weighting" and, in particular, on applications of this concept in various fields of economics. I then describe some major open questions in this area.
I.

Progress
The past few years have seen substantial progress in our understanding of the psychology of tail events. Much of this progress concerns the second of the two steps I described above, in other words, probability weighting. Several papers have used sophisticated methods to carefully estimate the probability weighting function from experimental data; taken together, these studies suggest that, at least in laboratory settings, probability weighting is a remarkably robust feature of risk attitudes (for a review, see Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012) . Meanwhile, other papers have linked probability weighting, both theoretically and empirically, to a wide range of economic phenomena. Indeed, in risk-related fields of economics such as finance, insurance, and gambling, there is now more empirical support for probability weighting than for loss aversion, an arguably better-known component of prospect theory.
2 It may be useful to briefly review some of this evidence.
obvious conceptually that the returns of out-of-the-money options are positively skewed; an investor does not need to experience these returns to figure this out.
Second, some of the applications of probability weighting discussed above suggest that, in field settings, people overweight tail events even when making decisions from experience. For example, the probability weighting view of the equity premium puzzle is that investors charge a high equity premium because they overweight the occasional stock market crashes they have experienced through time.
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Disentangling beliefs and preferences. Earlier, I attributed several financial, insurance, and gambling phenomena to probability weighting, a feature of individual preferences. But might these phenomena be driven instead by people's beliefs? 5 For example, according to the probability weighting view, investors "overpay" for the typical IPO stock because, while they correctly anticipate the distribution of the stock's future returns, they overweight the state of the world in which the stock turns out to be "the next Google." An alternative view, however, is that investors are over-estimating the likelihood of the stock being the next Google. Similarly, consumers may choose home insurance policies with low deductibles not because they overweight the state of the world in which they have to make a claim, but because they overestimate the likelihood of this state. Indeed, all of the applications of probability weighting I discussed above can be given a belief-based interpretation -and since people often do overestimate the likelihood of rare events, such an interpretation is not unreasonable. Moreover, the distinction between beliefs and preferences is important: overestimation is a mistake; it is less clear that overweighting is a mistake.
It remains an open question as to whether the phenomena I ascribed above to probability weighting are indeed driven by probability weighting or rather by biased beliefs. To answer this in a direct fashion, we would need reliable data on people's beliefs, and these are not easy to come by. Some indirect evidence, however, favors the preference-based interpretation. Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) document that several of the behaviors linked to probability weightingin particular, the preference for positively skewed assets -are observed more strongly among people who live in Catholic, rather than Protestant, regions of the U.S. One interpretation of this finding is that, while people in both Catholic and Protestant regions may initially be drawn to positively skewed assets because of probability weighting, people living in Protestant regions override this initial impulse because buying an asset purely for its positive skewness is akin to gambling, a behavior frowned upon by the Protestant church. The Catholic church, however, takes a more lenient view of gambling; this makes it easier for people in Catholic regions to act on their preference for skewness.
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Psychological determinants of overestimation and overweighting. An important challenge that is implicit in the earlier discussion, but that is worth stating explicitly, is that we need a better understanding of why people over-or under-estimate the likelihood of tail events; and of why they over-or under-weight these events in their decision-making.
I noted above that, given the central role the availability heuristic plays in judgment, it may be helping in explaining why people over-or under-estimate the likelihood of tail events.
Burns, Chiu, and Wu (2010) discuss other possible drivers of these estimation errors, including anchoring and adjustment, and the use of coarse chance categories.
6 See Barseghyan et al. (forthcoming,b) for a recent structural approach to disentangling beliefs and preferences.
